Archive Page 2
..cu dedicatie pentru Traian
…pe al carui blog nu pot intra ca e prea sofisticat pentru puterile mele:) Mai, scrie-mi daca te intereseaza sa intri pe voxpublica.ro… Mie-mi pare ca meritzi. Si ca-ti foloseste.
PS Si vreo se scrie vreo nu vre-o – ca sa fim chit:)
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…and the pursuit of happiness:)
…probabil stiti ca in declaratia de independenta, printre drepturile inalienabile sunt “viata, libertatea si cautarea fericirii”. Pare-se ca fraza a fost inspirata de Locke, numai ca la englez era vorba despre “viata, libertate si proprietate” (sa speculam ca proprietatea e asimilata, in America macar, cu aceasta goana dupa fericire?:) Arendt spunea ca una dintre marile probleme ale fondarii Americii a fost neprecizarea tipului de fericire: publica sau privata? comuna sau personala?
In fine, despre altceva vroiam sa vorbesc: un studiu recent – General Social Survey – arata ca, dupa trei decade de crestere economica, americanii sunt mai putin fericiti decat acum treizeci de ani (spre deosebire de europeni, in primul rand francezii si … mai ales italienii!, la care “nivelul de fericire” a crescut). Femeile, care in 1972 se declarau per ansamblu mai fericite decat barbatii, se simt acum la fel de nefericite (unii au aratat cu degetul spre miscarea feminista:).
Explicatia propusa e mult mai simpla: americanii sunt obsedati, din ce in ce mai obsedati, de fericire. Daca in 2000 au fost publicate 50 de carti despre cum sa fii fericit, in 2008 numarul acestora a ajuns la 4000! Poate ca o reactie la Calvinism, poate ca rezultat al mitologiei promovate pe toate canalele despre self-made man (sau woman), americanul nu mai poate crede ca the sky nu e the limit. Toti te invata cum sa “think positive”, teologia protestanta a devenit (asta din motive mai lesne de elucidat) o teologie a prosperitatii, orice companie serioasa are consultanti in team-building, toata lumea e indemnata sa creada ca poate scapa de cancer, ajunge milionar si the American idol.
(In treacat fie spus, am observat aceste tendinte importate si in Romania: de cancer scapi cu o gandire pozitiva si ceai de musetel, nimeni nu mai accepta gandul ca vine o vreme cand oamenii, ca si cocorii, mai si mor; cand se intampla, de vina sunt medicii, insuficienta incredere in puterea de vindecare a gandului sau ceaiul de musetel fiert cu doua minute prea mult cand nu era luna plina, s.a.m.d.)
Partea mai interesanta a studiului e constatarea ca fericiti sunt oamenii care nu cauta cu tot dinadinsul sa fie fericiti, oamenii care isi vad de ale lor, de obicei oamenii cu obsesii, dispusi sa indure orice pentru a-si vedea obsesia cu ochii, indiferent daca e vorba de o inventie, salvarea balenelor, copii cu facultate, sau (asta nu e un exemplu din studiu:) explorarea Amazonului:)) Dupa cum spunea Elenore Roosvelt, “fericirea nu e un scop, ci un byproduct”. Daca e si asta, ma grabesc sa adaug.
Am mai spus-o, dar o repet: e simpatic foc felul in care stiinta (y compris statistica) recupereaza incet-incet distanta care o separa de bunul simt. (Mai am un studiu despre modern parenting si progressive dads, dar ala il tin ‘pe maneca’ pentru o alta ocazie:))
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…nu mai are succes: nu se uita la serialul “Monk” suficient de multi oameni. Asa ca, frate-frate, da’ branza-i pe bani, punem punct unuia dintre cele mai relaxante si, in acelasi timp, “neobisnuite” serialuri “policier” de vineri seara. (Stati linistiti si linistite la locurile voastre - “Psych” merge-n continuare – ca e good looking si funny in a cool way). Ceea ce-mi prilejuieste, dincolo de tristete, cateva cugetari. Tampite, poate, dar cugetari, ors’cat.
De pe vremea comunismului mi-am dezvoltat, cumva, o mare toleranta in materie de filme. Imi amintesc, bunaoara, ca, pana la sfarsitul lui ‘89, daca n-aveam altceva de facut (ma rog, de-obicei aveam) ma uitam pana si la productiile TV ale timpului: daca agronomistul nu era prea destept si invatatoarea din sat prea trasa de par, puteam sa urmaresc un filmuletz comunist (teatru TV) cap-coada, si alb-negru, fara sa sughit prea tare. Eram, cu alte cuvinte, dispus sa ma “las prins” aproape de orice fictiune. (Ceea ce nu inseamna ca nu eram fascinat de Daneliuc, Fellini, Antonioni, Tarkovski, si restul: le puteam inghiti insa, si pe astea fara prea mari probleme – dar asta e o alta discutie; sau nu e?)
Margelatu? Cool! In general, am gustat cam toate filmele lui Sergiu Nicolaescu, desi, la o revedere la batranete, mi-am dat seama cat de tras de par era Comisarul Moldovan: dar nu sunt si filmele americane la fel? Imi amintesc pana in ziua de astazi replica din Dacii – “deoarece cam putzi”, “In nimicnicia mea am muscat mana care m-a hranit” (asta era Dinica, dar nu bag mana-n foc ca replica e 100% corecta); cea mai tare – din filmul ala al carui nume imi scapa (Nemuritorii? Putea fi atat de lame? Poate.) Picture this: o mana de romani smecherasi dar aprigi in lupta, gen eroii lui Sven Hassel – Casino – dar in Evul Mediu tarziu, sunt ingropati pana la gat in pamant, iar Amza Pellea incepe sa cante:”lasa, lasa, lasa, lasa, ca ne-ntoarcem noi acasa, si-nplantam cutitu-n masa, laaaa-sa!”
Numai pentru cantecelul asta si i-am iertat multe lui Sergiu Nicolaescu. Mi-a ingaduit sa visez. Sa supra-vietuiesc.
Revenind: n-am timp sa ma uit la televizor. Nu-mi dau ochii peste cap si pretind ca nu-mi place sau ca n-am la ce sa ma uit – desi deobicei nu-mi place si n-am timp – dar, tocmai de aceea, daca nu-i Discovery, Hsitory sau PBS, Daily Shoy si Colbert Report ma fixez pe cate un serial care se difuezeaza la o ora convenabila, dupa 11-12 noaptea. Sau vinerea, mai repede.
Si-a fost Monk. (Mai este si House!!! Asta inca mai merge) Pentru cei care nu l-ati vazut (desi, inteleg, se difuzeaza si-n Romania – sau s-a?) e un policier construit initial pe structura “in oglinda” a lui Columbo. Adica “dupa reteta”. Iti aratau crima la inceput, dupa care “restul” era “umplut” cu identificarea si dovedirea vinovatului.
Pentru cei care nu-i stiu, Monk era (este, inca) un personaj construit ca un Columbo intors pe dos. Daca, pardon, Columbo era zapacit, imbracat ca vai de lume, c-un ochi de sticla, nu dadeai doi bani pe el, aparent intotdeauna cu gandu-n alta parte (un personaj cu, pardon, care ma puteam identifica de minune:), Monk e maniac, obsedat de curatenie si ordine, trebuie sa atinga fiecare stalp pe langa care trece si sa indrepte orice pres de la intrarea in casa (ceva ce, surprinzator, faceam si eu!) – nu stiu de ce – serios, nu mi-e clar de ce – da’ mi-l sugereaza pe Mihnea sau pe Zbengu.
O vreme, mi-a luminat vinerile. Mi-am dat seama ca ceva nu e in regula in momentul in care criminalul a inceput sa nu mai fie aratat de la bun inceput. Asta era o delasare de la principiul filmului: era ca si cum lui Columbo ii aflai numele mic sau o vedeai pe mult-pomenita nevasta.
A fost – este – din cate inteleg, (evident, nu cunosc dedesubturile) o drama asemanatoare cu cea a catolicimului pana mai ieri: pe masura ce incerci sa te adaptezi, sa joci ping-pong in biserica, sa canti la chitara si sa pleznesti din palme – ei bine, in acceasi masura si pierzi. Incercand sa cucereasca un nou public, realizatorii au “reusit” perfomanta de a-si pierde si pe cel pe care-l aveau.
Va dati seama de diferenta? Pana acum 15-20 de ani, un serial precum Columbo a rezistat tot cam atat ( a mers pana la telefoanele celulare!!!). Acum? Monk nu mai rezista decat vreo doi ani si ceva. De ce? Lumea nu mai are rabdare. Lumea s-a tampit. Lumea nu mai gusta un deznodamant servit cu linguritza. Lumea nu mai gusta drumul pana la rezultat. Lumea prefera Psych.
Eu prefer sa merg la culcare. (it’s a joke!)
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…am primit o invitatie de a participa la o conferinta internationala la UBB – Europe in Today’s World Crisis. Nu mi-am facut sperante mari: e criza, bugetele s-au redus drastic, timpul e foarte scurt (nu pot lipsi decat cel mult de la un curs). Surprinzator, insa, am primit ceva promisiuni de finantare – suficient cat sa-mi acopere vreo jumatate din cheltuielile de deplasare. Poti sa rezisti unei asemenea ispite? Ca nu poti! Nu dupa ce de vreo doi ani n-ai mai dat pe-acasa…
Asa ca te scobesti prin buzunare, strangi din dinti, si-ti planifici o calatorie de cinci zile din care doua vei fi pe drum, iar in celelalte trei stii dinainte ca nu vei apuca sa faci nici jumatate din ceea ce ti-ai propus, nu vei apuca sa te intalnesti cu toti oamenii pe care ai vrea sa-i revezi, ba – colac peste pupaza – vei ajunge inapoi acasa pe la doua noaptea, pentru ca peste cateva ore sa te prezinti fresh si plin de farmec in fata studentilor:)
Hopa! “Inapoi acasa” am zis? Pai parca “acasa” plecam? Cum vine asta? Unde mi-e “acasa”?
Intrebarea asta m-a framantat si acum cativa ani: cand ai prea multe “acasa” – la Brad, unde m-am nascut, la Cluj, unde m-am facut “om mare”, m-am casatorit si-am avut copiii, sau aici, unde am casa si unde traim de ceva vreme – mai ai vreun “acasa”?
Exista, din cate vad, trei posibilitati de raspuns: (1) pick one and stick with it! (2) NU mai ai un acasa, nu-ti mai fa iluzii, accepta-ti statutul de dezradacinat; (3) problema e fals pusa: fiecare e un “acasa” “in its own rights”.
Raspunsul (1) mi se pare suspect de simplu si, oricum ai suci-o, nedrept. Raspunsul (2) suna a vaicareala de pomana si cliseu. Asa ca raman la (3).
“Acasa”, inclin sa cred, e ca soarele reflectat intr-o oglinda – un soare, un soare oglindit. Daca spargi, insa, oglinda, soarele ramane acelasi, dar imaginea lui e reflectata integral in fiecare dintre cele trei cioburi. Reflectata fara rest. S-a inmultit soarele? Nu, s-au inmultit imaginile acestuia. Soarele e acelasi, oglinda s-a spart. Si fiecare bucata de oglinda e egal indreptatita sa clameze “eu reflect soarele in intregul sau!” “Eu sunt acasa!”
Asa e. Acasa e in mine. Si se reflecta la fel de intreg si la Brad, si la Cluj, si-n America.
Daca tramvaiul e nedumerit cand ii cer sa ma duca acasa, e problema lui, nu a mea:) E un amarat de tramvai, ce pretentii poti sa ai?
Vorba lui Sorescu: “de aceea eu voi avea intotdeauna un avantaj fata de lucrurile care nu gandesc”. Si chiar daca, debusolat, tramvaiul va sari de pe sine, zdrobindu-ma de vreun stalp, intotdeauna se va gasi un om care, ganditor, sa se urce-n tramvai, ordonandu-i cu o voce visatoare sa-l duca acasa.
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… serios acum: ce aduce romanul de acasa? Aduce tziuca, miere, antibiotice, soric (daca are sange – Ancutza n-a avut), radacina de leustean (maica-mea a avut:). Aduc si visinata (cu fructe cu tot).
Boon. Ajunge Ancutza in Detroit (pentru necunoscatori, adapostul celei mai mari comunitati romanesti – vreo 300,00…) Intreaba vamesul: “slanina?”
Imaginati-va cum cum suna “slanina” cu accent american:)))))
Miere? Visinata? Tziuca? Dulceata? Da-i sa cante!!
Si, daca tot veni vorba, ce asculta romanul in America? Compact. Tudor Gheorghe. Seicaru. Pavel Stratan. Angela Similea. Jean Moscopol. Corina Chiriac. Dan Spataru:) – si altii…
“Am cravata mea, sunt pionier, si ma mandresc cu ea, sunt pionier”!:)))))
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…descending representation (II)
…cand am vazut ce succes a avut primul episod, m-am gandit ca, poate, n-ar trebui sa ma opresc aici.
Voi ati inceput!:) (si mai urmeaza:)
As a word, ‘representation’ comes from Latin (the Greeks had no word for ‘representation’), but its original meaning – to present someone or something absent – “had nothing to do with agency or government or any of the institutions of Roman life”.[i] “[I]ts real expansion begins in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the Pope and the cardinals are often said to represent the persons of Christ and the Apostles. The connotation is still neither of delegation nor of agency”.[ii] What Pitkin failed to observe is that the idea of representing ‘inferiors’ was yet to be discovered as well. By the sixteenth century ‘representation’ came to encompass representation of persons yet – the case of England aside – the classical ‘descending’ understanding of representation remained for more than a century unchallenged. One could represent only something of a superior or equal status, never the other way around.
In 16th and 17th century France, for example, one finds hundreds of instances where representation is mentioned: representations of God, of dreams, of incredible beauty, of heroic characters, of nature, of the loved ones, or of indescribable pains, but the representative had always a lower status than the represented. The original was always assumed to be superior to its re-presentative. The list of examples is too long to be exhausted here. Marc Vitruve Pollion talks in 1547 about “representer l’Harmonie celeste”;[iii] Joachim du Bellay in 1552 about “representer en ses vers tous les accidens divers de l’humaine tragedie” or “ung coeur vicieux”;[iv] the same year, Pierre de Ronsard asks “Morfée, s’ il te plaist de me representer Cette nuit ma Cassandre”;[v] in 1566 Louis des Masures claims “ces personnages donc, pour les cognoistre mieux, ay-je voulu ici representer aux yeux des benins spectateurs”;[vi] in 1607 Honoré d’Urfé wrote that “L’estonnement de Bellinde ne se peut representer”;[vii] and so forth. In one single work from 1610, Pierre de Deimier uses the term ‘representation’ eighteen times yet nowhere the idea of representing individuals of an inferior condition is ever mentioned.[viii] As Nicot, Thresor de la langue francaise, specifies in 1606, there is only one conceivable way one could represent ‘lay individuals’ – and that is as a community (Representer la communauté des citoyens, Personam civitatis gerere). The king or his magistrates did represent the people or another specific community because as a body a community is always a whole of which the head is but a part. As I will show shortly, the story was different across the Channel.
Despite an excellent analysis of the concept of representation starting with Hobbes, Pitkin fails to consider the possibility that the English evolution of the concept remains for at least a couple of centuries peculiar to England and its colonies across the Atlantic. A possible explanation for this overlooking might be found in her interpretation of the somehow unsettling time-gap between the French and the English understandings of representation between the thirteen and the sixteenth century.
Not until the sixteenth century do we find an example of “represent” meaning “to take or fill the place of another (person), substitute for”; and not until 1595 is there an example of representing as “acting for someone as his authorized agent or deputy”. Did the development in the meaning of “represent” that took place in Latin in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century, and that was at least under way in French in the thirteenth century, really not take place in English until the sixteenth century?[ix]
Although Pitkin suggests a more mundane answer to this question (English was less used in legal, juristic, and political works than Latin and French until the sixteenth century), she is also entertaining the possibility that the French acquired an earlier understanding of representation as ‘representation of another person’, and by doing so they were the first ones to open new political, more modern venues for the concept. The diagnosis might be correct – with an amendment. As Pitkin’s own examples confirm, whenever ‘representation’ is used in early French as ‘representation of a person’, it is either “for the way in which a magistrate or attorney stands and acts for the community” or, for a single person but with a higher status – “a bailiff can be spoken of representing the person of his lord”.[x]
As a matter of fact, the 1690 French dictionary makes explicit this interpretation:
Représenter – tenir la place de quelqu’un, avoir en main son autorité. Le pope représente Dieu sur la terre. Les Ambassadeurs représente le Prince. Le Magistrates représente le Roy. On dit aussi dans la cérémonie du Sacre, un tel Seigneur représentais le Duc de Normandie, le Comte de Champagne. On dit aussi dans les successions qu’un petit-fils représente son père décédé pour venire partager avec ses oncles a la succession d’un ayeul[xi]
In 1694, the first Dictionaire de l’Academie francaise offers a similar definition:
On dit, que Les Ambassadeurs representent les Souverains qui les envoyent, pour dire, que Par leur caractere, ils sont revestus en quelque façon de la dignité & des prerogatives de ceux de la part desquels ils sont envoyez. Ce qui rendoit cette assemblée encore plus illustre, c’estoit le grand nombre des Ambassadeurs qui representoient les plus grands Rois de la Chrestienté. les Ambassadeurs ont caractere pour representer leur maistre. On dit aussi, qu’Un Viceroy, qu’un Gouverneur de Province represente le Roy, le Prince dont il a pouvoir.[xii]
This type of representation remains a ‘descending’ one – the person to be represented is of a higher status, i.e., authority than the ‘representative’ – never the other way around. Among other things, this has important consequences when representation comes to the question of accountability. For according to this classic understanding, the representatives – elected, selected, or simply acknowledged as such – were accountable to and foremost to the higher authority they were designated to represent: God, the king, the princes, a certain community, or even the populus. If they failed their mission of representation, it was because they have failed to properly represent this higher principle or authority, not the individuals.[xiii] Except for the high-ranking officials sending out their representatives, the individuals who have chosen, designated, or accepted a representative (say, a member of the parliament, a bishop, the pope, etc.) did not grant nor create any authority in the process. Their authority was not delegated ‘bottom-up’ but ‘top-down’, with consequences that will become obvious in time.
2. The Dialectic of the Individual
Any discussion about political representation, i.e., about the relationship between individuals and the political sphere, ought to clarify the understanding of the very concept of ‘individual’. Contrary to the previously general agreed upon opinion according to which the question of ‘individuality’ is essentially a modern one, many historians acknowledge today that around the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the issue had already started to be framed in ways that can be regarded as frontrunners of the contemporary perspective. If for previous scholars, such as Jacob Burckhardt or Otto von Gierke, during the Middle Ages man was known solely in terms of collectivity (race, corporation, family, people, and the like) and the ‘true’ personality remained ‘the group’ until the Italian Renaissance – a perspective that will decisively influence the work of historians and sociologists of the twentieth century – contemporary scholars beg to differ.[xiv]
To their merit, the American historians were the pioneers of this unorthodox interpretation of the Mid Ages. Back in the 1920s, Charles Homer Haskins was the first one to talk (although with little impact) about the “Renaissance of twelfth century” and in an essay published in 1972 Colin Morris considers the period between 1050-1200, the time of “a rediscovery of the individual”.[xv] Their works will be re-evaluated by the end of the twentieth century and the beginnings of the twenty-first one, when the body of evidence became impressive.
Twelfth-century theological and philosophical texts had already emphasized a kind of ethical personalism by focusing on the sphere of private, individual intention behind acts. As Peter Abelard had proclaimed early in the twelfth century, it was the moral value of a person’s intentions that gave value to his acts rather than their consequences. Out of this concern for private intention arose the expanded practice of private confession as stipulated in the decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215.[xvi]
The evidence of a rational individual, morally responsible for his or her acts kept pilling up.
[i] Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel, The Concept of Representation, LA: University of California Press, (1967, 241).
[ii] Pitkin, Hanna, The Concept of Representation, 241 – emphasis added.
[iii] “representing the heavenly Harmony” – Pollion, Marc Vitruve [1547], Architecture ou Art de bien bastir, 74
[iv] “representing in his verses all the divers accidents of the human tragedy”; “a vicious heart” - Du Bellay, Joachim, 1522-1560. [1552], Oeuvre de l’ invention de l’ autheur (Bordas, Paris), Ed. D. Aris et F. Joubokovsky, 42, 101.
[v] “Morphee, if you like to represent me this night mine Cassandre” – Ronsard, Pierre de, 1524-1585. [1552], Les Amours (Classiques Garnier, Paris), Ed. Henri et Catherine Weber, 144.
[vi] “these characters than, for knowing them better, I wanting to represent here for the eyes of the benign spectators” – Des Masures, Louis, 1523?-1574. [1566], Epistres au seigneur Lebrun (Ed. Ch. Comte. Cornely et Cie, 1907, 8.)
[vii] “the astonishment of Bellinde cannot be represented” – Urfé, Honoré d’, 1567-1625. [1607], L’Astrée. T. 1, 396.
[viii] Deimier, Pierre de, ca. 1570-ca. 1618. [1610], L’Académie de l’art poétique (Paris, J. de Bordeaulx, 1610.)
[ix] Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 243.
[x] Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 242-3 – emphasis added.
[xi] “Representing – keeping somebody else’s place, having his authority in your hands. The Pope represents God on earth. The Ambassadors represent the Prince. The Magistrates represent the King. It is also said in the ceremony of the Sacre that certain Lord represented the Duke of Normandy, the Comte de Champagne. It is also said during the successions, that a grandson represents his dead father when he comes to divide with his uncles in the succession of an elder”.
[xii] “It is also said that the Ambassadors represent the Sovereigns who send them, for saying that according to their character, they assume in certain ways the dignity & the prerogatives of those in the name of whom they are sent. What made that assembly even more illustrious was the huge number of Ambassadors who represented the grandest Kings of Christianity. The Ambassadors have the character to represent their master. It is also said that a Viceroy, a Governor of a Province represent the King, the Prince from whom he has the power.”
[xiii] Voegelin, Eric, The New Science of Politics, University of Chicago Press, (1952) talks about the “transcendental” type of sense of representation, the sense in which a society is or can be “the representative of something beyond itself, of a transcendent reality”, “a transcendent truth” – pp. 54, 75. Yet, as it will become clear further, there are differences between Vogelin’s transcendental representation and the interpretation that I propose. In his account “a society must articulate itself by producing a representative that will act for it” (p.41).
[xiv] Burkhardt, Jacob, Civilisation de la Renaissance en Italie, tr. fr., Paris: Livre de Poche, (1966, 157); Gierke, Otto von, Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht, vl I; Rechtsgeschichte der deutschen Genossenschaft, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung (1868) – quoted in Anthony Black , “The individual and society” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450, J. H. Burns (ed.), Cambridge University Press (1991).
[xv] Haskins, Charles H., The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, New York, 1927 (1964). Morris, Colin The Discovery of the Individual (1972), quoted in L’Individu au Moyen Age: Individuation et individualization avant la modernite, Sous la direction de Brigitte Miriam Bedos-Rezak et Dominique Iogna-Prat, Aubier, Edition Flammarion, (2005, 11).
[xvi] Coleman, Janet, “The Individual and the Medieval State” in The Individual in Political Theory and Practice, ed. Janet Coleman, European Science Foundation: Clarendon Press, (1996, 16).
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…o provocare
…stiu prea bine regulile jocului: o postare pe blog trebuie sa fie scurta, iritanta, emotionala sau provocatoare, pe cat posibil pe un subiect popular – gen Elena Udrea, Michael Jackson, sex, Basescu, iubire, moarte, etc. Respecti regulile, ai accesari – se cheama ca ai succes. Nu le respecti, risti sa predici precum Moise-n desert, chinuit de indoiala “din vina mea, sau din vina cititorilor”?
(In treacat fie spus – stiu, nu e frumos, dar, din nou, nu ma pot abtine cand sunt muscat de cur:) – am mai multe accesari zilnice de la vizitatori unici decat orice cotidian clujean:))) Dar, si daca as avea de maine doar doua, la fel as scrie. )
[Nota: Da' de ce-mi verific, fie si la rastimpuri, accesarile cata vreme nu ma intereseaza? - Simplu. Pentru ca sunt oltean. Ardelean. Roman si, mai nou, American. Om, adica.]
Ma incumet, asadar, la (inca) un experiment (altul a fost cel cu “o postare nemaivazuta si nemaiauzita”, daca mai tin bine minte). Unul ceva mai domol: voi posta mai jos un fragment dintr-o ‘lucrare stiintifica’ – altfel decat ‘paper’ nu stiu sa-i zic – eseu? Eseu sa fie! Fragmentul cu pricina e in engleza si, cu scuzele de rigoare, il voi posta ca atare, dat fiind ca nu am timp sa-l traduc (si nici sa-l finisez, desi s-ar cuveni).
Ideea de baza e simpla – macar atat am invatat dupa atata amar de ani de stat printre americani: “daca o idee nu poate fi rezumata in trei fraze, fiecare de maxim trei randuri, aceea nu e o idee”. Deci: o tinem langa (de unde vine expresia asta – stie cineva?) de vreo doua secole cu ideea ‘reprezentantilor poporului’, fie ei regi, presedinti, ministri, primari, politisti sau factori postali. Acceptam, fara sa cracnim, ideea ca presedintele, senatorul sau deputatul, “ma” reprezinta. Ideea e falsa. Nimeni nu poate sa ma reprezinte – sunt unic. Alesul meu poate, cel mult, reprezenta o idee in care cred - atat.
Na, c-am depasit limita. Dar, daca veti avea rabdare sa cititi fragmentul de mai jos, veti intelege, sper, ce ma mana pe mine in lupta cu filosofia politica – ideea (accepata astazi pana si de catre evolutionaristi dar nu si de catre politologi) ca o solutie perdanta astazi poate fi invingatoare maine. Dinozaurii au avut succes. Mamiferele au avut, ca si Ted Kennedy (Doamne, iarta-ma!), rabdare. Dar maine?
Aici nu vorbim despre “filosofie in nori” – aci vorbim despre lacrimi si sange. Iar cine se mai indoieste despre eficacitatea pe termen lung a ideilor, sa faca bine sa se mai uite inca o data, la toate revolutiile, incepand cu a’ engleza, trecand prin a’ franceza, americana, rusa, sau.., romana. In extremis, poti avea o revolutie fara morti, dar nu poti avea o revolutie fara idei. Ca (mai) toti aia care le-au promovat au murit saraci lipitzi pamantului e o alta problema:)))
Iata provocarea: cititi pana la capat. E, repet, doar un fragment – si inca un fragment care, de facto, nu-mi apartine.(L-am descoperit pe Guizot de-abia dupa ce ajunsesem, pe-o cale diferita, la aceleasi concluzii, dar asta nu se numara). Imi pare, insa, ca mai clar de atat nu se poate.
Poate ma-nsel – dar daca o fac, o fac cu buna credinta:)
Incepem (daca reusesc sa copy:):
Lost in Translation –
Centripetal Individualism and the Classical Concept of Descending Representation
The overspread feeling of frustration and disappointment experienced by democracies old and new all across the world needs, unfortunately, little supportive evidence. The loss of confidence in politicians is repeatedly confirmed by polls and translates into record low turnovers at different levels of the electoral process. [i] It has been claimed that citizens’ loss of trust in their representatives not only raises ethical or philosophical difficulties but also endangers the very functioning of many democratic institutions, affecting the decision-making process.[ii] I argue that the problem is misstated. At least partially responsible for this situation is the modern concept of representation as representation of individuals delegating their rights and authority to an individual or a group of individuals. So deeply embedded is the assumption that this is the only proper way of understanding political representation that it perpetuates itself practically unchallenged in media, politics, academia, and – which is probably the most important – in the ranks of the electorate itself.
Following in the footsteps of Walter Ullmann, every author that in the past decades has seriously considered the challenges posed by the idea of political representation – from Hanna Pitkin to Edward S. Morgan, and from F.R. Ankersmit to Nadia Urbinatti – took it as a matter of fact: once the descending theory of representation has been discarded altogether with the divine rights of kings, it has been replaced once and for all for with its ascending version – the representation of the people.[iii] I claim that while the representation of people qua individuals properly qualifies as an ascending theory of representation, this has not been always the case. In continental Europe and especially in France, the representation of people has been understood for a longer period of time in the classical sense as descending (sometimes circular, as I will show) representation.[iv] The explanation is straightforward and made perfect sense for a seventeenth century European: as long as the concept of people is understood in a corporate, organic way (as universitas, rather than societas), the body is above all its representatives (king, parliament, etc). “The whole body was prior to and greater than the king, greater though he might be than any individual member of the realm”.[v]
The implications of such different understandings of representation are not to be discarded as mere matters of wording. An entire set of questions pertaining to the mandate versus independent agent controversy, accountability, aesthetic, promissory, anticipative, gyroscopic or surrogate representation, political community, etc. had to be either rethought on a new basis or, in some cases, discarded altogether. Evidently, these are more than mere academic issues, having direct implications on the ways both citizens and politicians understand themselves, their relationship, and the possibilities opened or closed by modern politics. After all, as Quentin Skinner argues, “what is possible to do in politics is generally limited by what is possible to legitimize. What you can hope to legitimize, however, depends on what courses of action you can plausibly range under existing normative principles”.[vi]
I would not claim that this attempt to rethink the basis of political representation is a pioneering one.[vii] At the beginning of the nineteenth century, François Guizot realized already that the modern concept of representation was seriously flawed. He argued that a representative government ought not to be confounded with the sovereignty of the people understood as a collection of wills. Once ‘reason, truth and justice’ are marginalized in favor of a system based on the representation of individual wills, such an understanding would not be different in principle from an aristocratic government for “it connects the right to govern, not with capacity, but with birth”.[viii] Once one declares the individual sovereign in virtue exclusively of his will, it doesn’t matter if this individual is a king, a nobleman or a ‘lay’ citizen. “The participation in sovereignty is in each case the result of a purely material fact, independent of the worth of him who possesses it, and of the judgment of those over whom it is to be exercised”.[ix] The principle of the sovereignty of the people understood as a mere collection of individual wills “is then radically false; for, under the pretext of maintaining legitimate equality, it violently introduces equality where none exists, and pays no regard to legitimate inequality”.[x]
Obviously, we do not really believe, claims Guizot, in the equality of wills as foundation for a representative government, otherwise we will not prevent children or madmen from voting, for their wills do not differ in nature from that of a full-grown man.[xi] We do believe instead that some are better equipped than others to seek and discover justice, and to protect the general interests of a society. It is reason, not will, that we take into consideration in any election. We do not truly believe that the only legitimate laws for an individual are the ones of which he had willingly consented, for then “this axiom [does] not leave any standing place for organized power”. For what if my will changes? “Yesterday my will was the only source of legitimacy for the law; why then should the law remain legitimate when it is no longer sanctioned by my will? Can I not will more than once? Does my will exhaust its rights by a single act?”[xii] Answering that the individual ‘willingly’ accepted the will of majority as his will won’t do either. We don’t really believe that a majority of wills will transform an unreasonable decision into a reasonable one, nor an evidently unjust law into a just one, for then the despotism of the majority could not be check.[xiii] “What we call representation … is not an arithmetical machine employed to collect and count individual wills”.[xiv] Furthermore, we do not truly believe that we stand in relationship with ‘our’ representatives as a master over his servant (rather the opposite), nor do we truly believe that each and every single one of us can be possible equally represented by the same individual or group of individuals, for this would deny the very individuality, i.e., uniqueness that we pretend to cherish so much.
So why cling to a model of representation that we don’t really believe in, trying to improve something evidently misconstrued from its very basic assumptions? In recent years, the idea of individual representation came once more under scrutiny from a variety of perspectives. Castiglione and Warrren, for example, point out that ‘…from the perspective of those who are represented, what is represented are not persons as such, but some of the interests, identities, and values that persons have or hold’.[xv] The individual qua person cannot be represented because what is called ‘the multiple self” cannot be reduced neither to ‘my’ will, nor to only one instrumental form of rationality. If one talks about ‘narrative self’, ’ messy self’, ‘loosely integrated self’, ‘hierarchical self’, ‘parallel selves’ and so forth, if, in other words, one is not sure how to present oneself, how can one possible be re-presented by others, which claim to be equally representing many other persons as well?[xvi] Dryzek and Niemeyer propose as a solution ‘representing discourses not selves’ as a way to enhance democratic deliberation.[xvii] Representatives are then to be apprehended as no longer ‘my’ representatives but as representatives of different types of discourse I believe in (liberal, social-democrat, and the like). As such, these representatives are not accountable to ‘me’, qua individual, but to the ideas and/or the ideals they have promised to uphold while I, qua person, maintain intact the right and the responsibility to directly participate in the ongoing debate.
It goes without saying that such proposals raise questions of their own and I am far from fully supporting anyone of them in particular. However, I do think that these are all valuable attempts to radically change our way of conceiving and understanding political representation. By reviewing and contrasting the classical notion of descending representation with its modern counterpart in a time when they were still coexisting side by side and the victory of the latter over the former was far from clear, I hope to offer a historical perspective on ‘how we got here’ and by doing so to broaden our sense of possibilities to rethink some deeply embedded assumptions about politics. What appeared as obsolete yesterday might be today the key to survival and thriving. Evolution does not follow a linear path neither in biology nor in the political realm. The fact that the dinosaurs were so successful for such a long period of time did not guarantee their survival when times changed. It appears that times are now changing in politics as well. And sometimes, in such periods, the winner loses all.
[i] The GfK Trust Index for 2008 and 2009 found politicians being the lest trusted class of professionals, with a general trust level between 14 and 18%, going as low as 6% (Greece) or 10% (France). For comparison, firefighters, teachers, postal workers and doctors enjoy levels of trust over 80%. Even lawyers appear to be trustworthier than politicians. In USA, the levels are somehow higher (21%) yet they remain the lowest level of trust for any group of professionals. See GfK Custom research press releases for 2008 and 2009.
[ii] See V. Braitwhite, V.-M. Levi, eds.: Trust and Governance, New York: Russel Sage Foundation (1998); C. Offe – U.K. Preuss, “Democratic Institutions and Moral Resources”, in D. Held, ed., Political Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press (1991).
[iii] In fact, rather than preceding the contractualist theory, the theory of the divine right of kings is better understood as a reaction to the latter, as Gordon Scochet persuasively argued – Scochet, Gordon J., Patriarchalism in Political Thought: The Authoritarian Family and Political Speculation and Attitudes Especially in Seventeenth-Century England, New York: Basic Books, Inc., (1975). For a somehow different perspective, but one that argues also in favor of the modernity of this theory, see Daniel Engster, Divine Sovereignty – The Origins of Modern State Power, Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press (2001). For the ascending versus descending theories of representation see, for example, Walter Ullmann, The Individual and Society in the Middle Ages, (Baltimore, Maryland: The John Hopkins Press, 1966); Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press (1967); Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, New York: W. W. Norton & Company (1988); F. R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value, Stanford: Stanford University Press, (1996); Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and Genealogy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (2006); Philip Petit, Made with Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press (2008); Jane Mansbridge, “Rethinking Representation”, American Political Science Review, 97, 4. Obviously this list is far from exhaustive.
[iv] In the space of this essay, I am unable to discuss other European theories and assumptions about representation. However, considering the evidence, I think that France during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was quite representative for an entire continental way of conceptualizing the problem of political representation.
[v] Lloyd Howell A., The State, France and the Sixteenth Century, London: George Allen & Unwin (1983: 153). One can see why up until now it has been generally assumed that the ascending theory of representation spread much sooner all over Europe. The ambiguity of the term “people” was present even during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as it is today. Not only could it signify a multitude as well as a whole but also it could have been used to designate either a conceptualized community (populus) or the lowest, uneducated and undisciplined part of society (plebs). See Hubert Carrier, Le labyrinthe de l’état: Essai sur le débat politique en France au temps de la Fronde (1648-1653), Paris Honore Champion Editeur, 2004: 121-122
[vi] Skinner, Quentin, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge University Press, (1998, 105)
[vii] After all, we still take for granted that the postal functionary or the police officer is a ‘representative’ of the government, although neither one enjoys his or her authority as the result of a delegation of authority from us.
[viii] Guizot, François, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew R. Scoble, Introduction and notes by Aurelian Craiutu, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund (2002, 60)
[ix] Guizot, François, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew R. Scoble, Introduction and notes by Aurelian Craiutu, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund (2002, 57)
[x] Guizot, François, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew R. Scoble, Introduction and notes by Aurelian Craiutu, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund (2002, 60)
[xi] Guizot, François, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew R. Scoble, Introduction and notes by Aurelian Craiutu, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund (2002, 293)
[xii] Guizot, François, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew R. Scoble, Introduction and notes by Aurelian Craiutu, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund (2002, 288)
[xiii] For similar positions see also Alexis de Tocqueville or John Stuart Mill.
[xiv] Guizot, François, The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew R. Scoble, Introduction and notes by Aurelian Craiutu, Indianapolis, Liberty Fund (2002, 295-6)
[xv] Castiglione, Dario, and Mark E. Warren, ‘Rethinking Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues’, presented at the Conference on Rethinking Democratic Representation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver (2006:13), quoted in John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 4, November, 2008, 483.
[xvi] See McCarthy, Joan, Dennett and Ricoeur on the Narrative Self, New York: Humanity Books (2007); Elster, Jon, ed., The Multiple Self, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1986), Rosner, Jennifer, ed., The Messy Self, Boulder & London: Paradigm Publishers (2007)
[xvii] Dryzek, John and Simon Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 4, November, 2008, 481-493.
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…mda, nu-i frumos sa te lauzi, da’ uneori asa de tare-ti vine!:) O facui si pe asta: in linii mari acelasi deal ca la Princeton – conferinta nationala anuala de political theory, blind reviews, 8 papers selectate din toata tara – si, cu voia dumneavoastra, printre ele si cel al suprasemnatului (altul, de buna seama, nu cel de la Princeton).
De-acum se cheama ca nu mai e accident. Ceva bine trebuie ca fac…
Asa ca la sfarsitul lui octombrie va voi spune cum e si la Harvard.
Ar mai fi Oxfordul – dar ala-i peste garla si-acum sa nu intindem coarda prea tare:))
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…traim cu totii cu un cate “la o adica” atarnat deasupra capului. Pe acest la “o adica” se bazeaza intreaga industrie asigurarilor, dar nu numai. Pe acest “la o adica” se bazeaza, conform biologiei evolutionariste, a antropologiei moderne, etc., milostenia, generozitatea, etc. Adicatelea, eu iti fac bine in speranta ca si tu (sau Doamne-Doamne) imi va face mie, “la o adica”, bine. Acest tip de gandire se numeste in “literatura de specialitate”, i.e., a Sfintilor Parinti, “calea vechilului”. Buna si aia, “la o adica”.
Da’ nu despre asta vroiam sa vorbesc, ci despre ceva mult mai simplu: o pana de curent, sa zicem. In Romania, inainte ‘89, intreruperea curentului era ceva … curent (n-am gasit alt joc de cuvinte mai stupid:). Se faceau bancuri pe tema asta, invatam pentru Anatomie I (eu) si Farmacologie (Alina) la o lampa de petrol, in Hasdeu se strigau, la adapostul intunericului, lozinci anti-comuniste, etc.
Da’ cand in America secolului XXI se ia curentul dupa un bubuit groaznic de rasuna vecinatatea, e sigur ca e treaba serioasa: lumea iese in strada, lumea suna la Duke Energy (unde un robot te linisteste ca se cunoaste, echipa lucreaza, situatia e sub control, nu exista untime-frame, etc).
Curentul “se ia” (observati reflexul? “se ia”, sau “se taie”, nu “se intrerupe” + impersonalul “se”) pe la sapte seara. E inca lumina, afara nu e extraordinar de cald, situatia e sub control, lumea reintra in case. Se face intuneric. Lumea incepe sa scoata cata o lumanare, cate un vecin incepe sa-ti bata la usa: aveti lumanari?
Noi aici avem de toate, si noroi si libertate, vorba poetului. Si lumanari (unele de la Paste, altele frumos mirositoare, altele “de supravietuire” din vremea Amazonului), si lanterne: mari, mici, de frunte, etc. Mai grav e ca n-avem televizor, n-avem computer (decat ce mai merge pe baterii) dar fara internet. Avem, insa, radio – cu baterii. Ascultam pe intuneric NPR (muzica clasica) si mancam la lumina lumanarii. Baietii se culca mai devreme decat de obicei dupa ce se joaca cu facand umbre pe pereti. Eu citesc ce nu mai apucasem, la lumina lanternei. Ancutza doarme. Imi pare ca as putea trai si asa, ca am putea tari si asa: cutit avem, topor avem, macheta avem, scule avem, de dezinfectat apa avem, rasaduri avem, pusti avem, undite avem.
Daca e sa fie, la o adica, ne descurcam. Daca mor maine, baietii mei se vor descurca sa faca un foc, sa impuste si sa jupoaie o veverita, sa prinda un peste si sa-l prajeasca. Cainii (mai cu seama Lucy si Vasile) ii vor proteja, la o adica, de raufactori. Asta ma face sa ma simt bine in vreme ce citesc discursurile lui Lincoln pentru cursul de luni.
E aberant, stiu – dar e odihnitor: i-am invatat cu gandul ca maine tot ceea ce luam de sigur, de la curent la banci, la scoli, la masini toate astea pot sa dipsara. Nu zic ca vor. Zic ca pot. Trebuie sa stii sa supravietuiesti. Si-ai mei stiu. Cand mergem la pescuit stiu care e regula – sa prinzi suficient cat sa te hranesti pe tine si familia ta pentru o zi. Si ma simt bine, ca un redneck ce sunt, vorba lui Andrei (care tocmai a facut din doua biciclete una buna). Un redneck ciudat, care citeste de drag filosofie, asculta muzica clasica si merge la pescuit sau prin jungla.
Curentul a venit, ca-n povesti, la miezul noptii.
PS Viata, insa, e mai parsiva decat electricitatea. “La o adica”, murim.
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…si se duc, se duc pe rand…
…azi am mutat-o pe Ana in camin. La inceput, n-am luat-o prea in serios. Nu se muta la capatul lumii (campusul e la 10-15 minute cu masina), nu isi golea camera (doar poate veni oricand sa-si suplimenteze inventarul), etc. E drept, Alec si-a manifestat deja interesul de a-si muta o parte din calabalac in camera ramasa (teoretic) dipsonibila, Andrei l-a incurajat din rasputeri (ca doar vrea si el o camera doar a lui) – dar toata discutia a fost ingropata deocamdata sub semnul provizoratului (“don’t you ever dare to touch my stuff!” – Ana, care ar pleca si ea fara sa chiar plece). Prinsi in valtoarea scandalului dintre adolescenti si puberi, n-am mai avut timp si pentru emotii.
Situatia s-a schimbat dramatic dupa ajungerea in campus: cozi de masini pe toate strazile si stradutele (nu claxona, insa, nimeni, si nimeni nu injura cu voce tare:), toate trotuarele aglomerate cu perne, televizoare, cuptoare cu microunde, ciorapi, cutii si ce mai vreti, politisti indicand parintilor disperati care e caminul cutare si pe unde s epoate ajunge mai bine, cativa angajati ai universitatii impartind gratis sticle de apa nevoiasilor coplesiti de caldura, tineri excitati ca “in sfarsit, pleaca de-acasa” – ce mai? Tacamul complet, pe care pana acum il vazusem doar in filme.
Avantajul de a merge la aceeasi scoala cu fii-ta si-a spus cuvantul:) Mi-a luat fix cinci minute sa gasesc un loc de parcare, in vreme ce mama colegei de camera a Anei (altminteri si ea localnica), a bezmeticit prin campus vreme de o ora. Pe cand a reusit sa se parcheze, tot calabalacul fetelor era deja in camera. Am invartit mobila conform indicatiilor, mi-am salvat piciorul dupa ce un dulap rasturnat de catre Ana era cat pe ce sa mi-l faca terci, am recapitulat problemele administrative pe care le mai are astazi de facut. Situatia era sub control.
“Deci diseara vii acasa?” “Vin”, zice, “dar nu dorm. Vin doar sa mananc. Vreau sa dorm si eu in camera asta, sa vad cum e.”
Iti vin atunci tot felul de replici in cap: “Cum sa fie? Ca doar o vezi – apuci sa dormi in ea pana te saturi!’”, s.a.m.d. Nu spui, insa, nimic. Cand vine vremea sa plece, pleaca. Asa au plecat parintii mei de-acasa, asa am plecat eu, asa vor pleca, probabil si copiii ei. Cand vine vremea sa te duci, te duci. La inceput va veni acasa des, apoi din ce in ce mai rar, apoi aproape deloc. Asa merg lucrurile. Stii toate astea – teoretic. Practica, insa, te omoara.
PS Deocamdata, insa, are cursuri lunea si miercurea in aceeasi cladire in care le tin si eu pe ale mele, ba chiar la ore apropiate. Ca omul gospodar, isi face vara sanie…:)
LATE UPDATE: La loc comanda!:) Dupa ce am scris randurile de mai sus, dupa ce a sunat ca nu mai vine acasa sa manance, c-a mancat cu prietenele in oras, dupa ce maica-sa s-a dus dimpreuna cu fratii ei (ai Anei, de buna seama) sa vada cum s-a instalat si au plecat de acolo la 10 seara, dupa ce Ana si Bethany si-au dat seama ca nu au televizor (adica au, dar fara cablul de antena nu-l poti folosi decat de mobila), ca n-au aer conditionat iar pentru ventilator le trebuie un prelungitor, dupa ce au realizat ca dusul “de pe hol” nu prezinta aceleasi conditii ca si cel de acasa, dupa ce s-au uitat o vreme una in ochii celeilalte – juna sunt, bela sunt, de nimeni nu depand – a avut o scena parca desprinsa din Tom Sawyer: Bethany (care, va reamintesc, o convinsese sa ramana peste noapte,) a zis ca i s-a facut foame: da o fuga pana acasa, ia si-un prelungitor si se intoarce. Sau poate nu. Ana a zis ca ea singura nu ramane in camera – ce-ar fi sa plece amandoua acasa si sa inceapa traiul independent de maine? Zis si facut: la miezul noptii, ca si Cenusareasa, Ana a aparut acasa – Alec, care adormise fericit in noul sau pat, a trebuit mutat, adormit, la loc. Ana a intrat direct in dus si-acum da tarcoale frigiderului. Are si independenta asta dezavantajele ei. Asa ca se duc ei, da’ se mai si intorc:)
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